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Judges and forensic science education: A national survey 
Abstract 
In criminal cases, forensic science reports and expert testimony play an increasingly important role in 
adjudication. More states now follow a federal reliability standard, which calls upon judges to assess the 
reliability and validity of scientific evidence. Little is known about how judges view their own background 
in forensic scientific evidence, and what types of specialized training they receive on it. In this study, we 
surveyed 164 judges from 39 different U.S. states, who attended past trainings at the National Judicial 
College. We asked these judges about their background in forensic science, their views concerning the 
reliability of common forensic disciplines, and their needs to better evaluate forensic science evidence. 
We discovered that judges held views regarding the scientific support for different forensic science 
disciplines that were fairly consistent with available literature; their error rate estimates were more 
supported by research than many estimates by laypersons, who often assume forensic methods are 
nearly infallible. We did not find any association between how judges rate forensic reliability and prior 
training. We did, however, find that training corresponded with judges’ views that they should, and do in 
fact, take on a more active gatekeeping role regarding forensics. Regarding the tools judges need to vet 
forensic experts and properly evaluate forensic science evidence, they reported having very different 
backgrounds in relevant scientific concepts and having forensic science education needs. Judges 
reported needs in accessing better material concerning reliability of forensic science methods. These 
results support new efforts to expand scientific evidence education in the judiciary. 
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 In criminal cases, forensic science reports and expert testimony play an increasingly 
important role in adjudication. More states now follow a federal reliability standard, which calls 
upon judges to assess the reliability and validity of scientific evidence. Little is known about how 
judges view their own background in forensic scientific evidence, and what types of specialized 
training they receive on it. In this study, we surveyed 164 judges from 39 different U.S. states, 
who attended past trainings at the National Judicial College. We asked these judges about their 
background in forensic science, their views concerning the reliability of common forensic 
disciplines, and their needs to better evaluate forensic science evidence. We discovered that 
judges held views regarding the scientific support for different forensic science disciplines that 
were fairly consistent with available literature; their error rate estimates were more supported by 
research than many estimates by laypersons, who often assume forensic methods are nearly 
infallible. We did not find any association between how judges rate forensic reliability and prior 
training. We did, however, find that training corresponded with judges’ views that they should, 
and do in fact, take on a more active gatekeeping role regarding forensics. Regarding the tools 
judges need to vet forensic experts and properly evaluate forensic science evidence, they 
reported having very different backgrounds in relevant scientific concepts and having forensic 
science education needs. Judges reported needs in accessing better material concerning reliability 
of forensic science methods. These results support new efforts to expand scientific evidence 
education in the judiciary. 










In criminal cases, forensic science reports and expert testimony play an increasingly 
important role in adjudication. All states and the federal government require judges to screen 
forensic evidence, as with any expert evidence, before admitting it at a trial. Many states now 
follow standards based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals and its progeny, a standard, which calls upon judges to assess the reliability and 
validity of scientific evidence (Daubert, 1993; Fed. R. Evid. 702). Although scholars predicted a 
“paradigm shift” in judicial approaches towards forensic science following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Daubert (Saks & Koehler, 2001), no dramatic shift has occurred in the courts: 
“at least in criminal cases, forensic science evidence is not routinely scrutinized pursuant to the 
standard of reliability enunciated in Daubert” (NRC, 2009, p. 106). Indeed, there is evidence that 
judges do not commonly engage with or rule on reliability questions regarding forensic evidence, 
forensic science methods (Garrett & Fabricant, 2018), or the proficiency of a given expert 
(Garrett & Mitchell, 2018). Nevertheless, a more gradual shift in judicial approaches may be 
forthcoming. 
In recent years, more forensic techniques have received scientific scrutiny regarding their 
reliability, with new research documenting error rates (PCAST, 2016), new standards for 
terminology and conclusions (DOJ, 2019), and critical scientific reports asking that limits be 
placed on overreaching uses of forensics in criminal courts (NRC, 2009). Leading reports, such 
as the influential 2009 National Academy of Sciences Report (NRC, 2009), have noted that 
judges have not taken an active or effective role in accomplishing their gatekeeping 
responsibilities to review the reliability of forensic evidence in criminal cases. Indeed, while in 
recent years, forensic practitioners, prosecutors, and forensic professional associations (IAI 









judges have imposed very few such limits or standards. The challenge for the judiciary is how to 
take advantage of the work being done in the broader scientific community to improve the use of 
forensic science in court.  
One challenge for efforts to improve judicial use of forensic evidence is the lack of 
scientific background and education among lawyers generally, and among judges in particular. 
After all, “scientific evidence tests the abilities of judges, lawyers, and jurors, all of whom may 
lack the scientific expertise to comprehend the evidence and evaluate it in an informed manner” 
(Dev. Law, 1995). The NRC Report noted that, “judges and lawyers…generally lack the 
scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate forensic evidence in an informed 
manner” (NRC, 2009, p. 78). In its tenth recommendation, the Report noted, the need to “support 
law school administrators and judicial education organizations in establishing continuing legal 
education programs [in forensic science] for law students, practitioners, and judges” (NRC, 
2009, p. 239).  
New training programs geared towards judges have been developed in response to such 
recommendations. Some have been hosted by the American Association for the Advancement of 
Science (AAAS); ABA Judicial Division Forensic Science Committee; Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC); The National Courts and Sciences Institute (NCSI); and the National Judicial College 
(NJC). In 2015, the National Commission of Forensic Science recommended that a national 
curriculum for judges be developed; the Department of Justice did not follow up on that 
recommendation (NCFS, 2015). There have been training materials developed for judges, most 
prominently the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, developed by the Federal Judicial 
Center and the National Research Council (FJC, 2011), as well as the Science Bench Book for 









& JSI, 2019). However, the effectiveness of such training materials—and consequent judge 
perceptions—is unknown. 
In the wake of the Daubert court ruling and recent pushes to advance the scientific base 
for many forensic sciences, there have been studies addressing perceptions of forensic science 
evidence in court. Studies have examined how laypersons, jurors, and even forensic analysts, 
assess forensic evidence (e.g., Hans, 2007; Koehler, 2017; Lieberman et al., 2008; Murrie et al., 
2019). Taken together, the literature suggests that many individuals are aware that forensic 
science analyses can be erroneous, but also that perceptions of forensic science evidence vary 
widely. Far less is known about the state of judicial training in forensic science, how judges view 
their own background in forensic and scientific evidence, or what additional types of specialized 
training they would like to receive on forensics, including at the state level. Recruiting lay 
participants is far more readily managed than recruiting judges. Further, there are reasons to 
think that judges may have different attitudes towards forensics than lay jurors; for example, one 
study comparing views of lawyers and jurors found that lawyers were more skeptical of forensic 
evidence than laypersons (Garrett & Mitchell, 2016). 
A handful of surveys of judges concerning forensic evidence has been conducted. 
Gatowski and colleagues (2001) surveyed 400 state judges concerning their attitude towards 
gatekeeping under Daubert, and found that they overwhelmingly supported that role and agreed 
that scientific support is needed for expert methods, but that they were quite unfamiliar with 
scientific concepts such as error rates. A 2001 survey of Virginia judges inquired into attitudes 
toward mental health experts, finding that most preferred traditional clinical testimony to 
research or statistically-based testimony (Redding, 2001). A 2009 survey of Polish judges found 









of scientific evidence” (Wójcikiewicz, 2013). Judges have also been surveyed regarding their 
attitudes toward eyewitness evidence in the U.S. (Wise & Safer, 2004) and in other countries 
(Jiang & Luo, 2016). One study compared lay and judicial responses to MtDNA evidence (Hans, 
2007). Other surveys of judges involved very small numbers of participants, such as a study of 
13 judges regarding their familiarity and views concerning digital evidence (Kessler, 2010). 
In the current study of a national sample of judges who attended past trainings at the 
NJC, we surveyed judges concerning their background in forensic science, their views 
concerning the reliability of common forensic science disciplines, and their needs to help better 
evaluate forensic science evidence. Moreover, we explored whether judges’ histories of forensic 
science trainings influenced their views of forensic science evidence. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited using the National Judicial College’s (NJC) course enrollment 
database. We invited judges who had attended a course at the NJC between 2015 – 2020, and 
who reported overseeing felony, criminal, and jury trials as a judge. Using this criteria, 938 
judges were randomly selected and invited to participate in our study.
1
 
Participants were 164 judges (17.5% response rate) from 39 different U.S. states, with 
Kansas (n = 11), Minnesota (n = 8), and New Mexico (n = 7) having the largest representation. 
                                                 
1 1000 judges were randomly selected under our study selection criteria. However, 62 judges were unable to receive 
the email invitation to our study due to email security filters. Since these judges didn’t have the opportunity to 









Almost all participants held law degrees (n = 138; 97.9%) and most participants were general 
jurisdictions judges (n = 129; 91.5%). However, other participants indicated that they served as 
limited jurisdiction judges (n = 4; 2.8%), tribal court judges (n = 4; 2.8%), or in other judicial 
roles (e.g., military court judge; n = 1; 0.7%). Participants typically had 13 years of judicial 
experience (SD = 8.5; range = 1 to 42) and were an average age of 60 years old (SD = 8.5; range 
= 33 to 80). Of those who responded to our demographic questions, most were male (n = 100; 
73.0%), and Caucasian (n = 118; 71.1%). However, participants also identified as African 
American (n = 7; 4.2%), Hispanic/Latino (n = 4; 2.4%), American Indian/Alaskan Native (n = 3; 
1.8%), Asian (n = 3; 1.8%), and “Other” (n = 3; 1.8%) ethnicities.  
Procedure and Materials 
Participants who were selected to take our survey were notified through email one week 
prior to receiving our survey. The notification email informed the participants about the purpose 
of the survey, the time it would take to complete, and the day they would receive a survey 
invitation. After a week, participants received a survey link to our online Qualtrics survey. 
Participants were given two weeks to respond before they were sent a reminder email from the 
researchers. Two reminders were sent to participants, both two weeks apart. After 6 weeks, data 
collection was complete, and the survey was closed. The data and materials used in this research 
are publicly available at: https://osf.io/evnzd/ 
Survey 
Survey participants completed a three-part survey reporting their background in forensic 
science, their views concerning the reliability of common forms of forensic evidence, and their 









describe their past experiences with forensic science through multiple questions inquiring about 
the number and percentage of past cases in which forensic science evidence was presented before 
them.  
Section two of the survey focused on training and resources. Participants were asked to 
report the amount (e.g., “less than one day of training”), content (e.g., “statistical methods”), and 
context (e.g., “law school”) of past trainings on forensic science evidentiary issues. Relatedly, 
participants were asked to report the ideal context for judicial training on forensic science 
evidence and which topics they would be interested in receiving specific training. They also 
described the availability of forensic science education resources in their jurisdiction and 
identified types of resources they currently use, or would use, to help evaluate forensic science 
methods.  
Section three of the survey asked participants to describe their familiarity with statistical 
methods and estimate the rate of false positive errors in seven common forensic science 
disciplines. In other words, we asked judges to estimate the rate in which an experienced forensic 
scientist would mistakenly conclude a match or identification where none truly exists. In line 
with previous error rate studies (e.g., Koehler, 2017; Murrie et al., 2019; Thompson et al., 2013), 
judges were given a 14-point logarithmic scale to estimate error rates ranging from 
“approximately 1 time in 2,” to “such an error is impossible.” Finally, judges were asked to 











Judicial Backgrounds in Forensic Science 
Experiences 
 There was significant variability in the reported percentages of criminal cases that 
presented forensic science evidence, and in judges’ usual responses to such evidence. Judges 
typically indicated that 37.4% of cases presented forensic science evidence (Mdn = 31.0%; SD = 
23.4), but estimates ranged from 0% to 92%. Judges further indicated that they held a hearing on 
the admissibility of forensic science evidence in only 14.7% (Mdn = 10.0%; SD = 19.3) of cases, 
but again estimates ranged from 0% to 100%. In addition, judges estimated that they ruled 
forensic science evidence testimony inadmissible in approximately 13.5% of cases (Mdn = 5.0%; 
SD = 20.4), with estimates ranging from 0% to 100%. Most judges indicated that their 
jurisdiction used the Daubert standard (n = 105; 65.2%), although others endorsed the Frye 
standard (n = 30; 18.6%) or another standard (n = 26; 16.1%). Interestingly, judges from 
jurisdictions using the Daubert standard (13.9%) did not differ from those in jurisdictions using 
the Frye standard (11.0%) or another standard (11.8%) in the estimated percentage of cases in 
which they ruled forensic science evidence inadmissible, F(2, 136) = 0.27, p = .76, ƞp² = .004. 
Within the past three years, most judges estimated that 40 of their cases presented forensic 
science evidence. However, this data was positively skewed in that the median estimate was 10 











Judges endorsed wide-ranging training histories specific to forensic science evidence.
2
 
Specifically, 29.6% (n = 45) of judges reported completing more than one week of training, 
27.0% (n = 41) completed more than two days of training, 17.1% (n = 26) completed one day of 
training, 16.4% (n = 25) completed less than one day of training, and 9.9% (n = 15) reported that 
they had not received any training on the topic. 
Regarding particular forensic science training topics, most judges reported that they had 
received training on the standards for admissibility of forensic evidence (n = 128; 77.1%), DNA 
technology (n = 94; 56.6%), and crime lab procedures (n = 83; 50.0%). However, less than half 
of surveyed judges received training on cognitive bias and human factors (n = 80; 48.2%), 
standards and terminology for expressing conclusions (n = 46; 27.7%), statistical methods (n = 
40; 24.1%), cognitive methods (n = 28; 16.9%), measurement of error rates (n = 28; 16.9%), and 
privacy issues concerning forensic tests (n = 14; 8.4%). Overall, judges reported a moderate level 
of familiarity with the statistical methods that underlie different types of forensic science 
evidence (M = 4.51; SD = 2.31) on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 = Unfamiliar and 10 = Very 
Familiar, although some judges indicated that they were completely unfamiliar (i.e., endorsed 1) 
or rather familiar (i.e., endorsed 9).  
We also asked judges to describe the context of their forensic science trainings. An 
overwhelming majority of judges reported that they received training on forensic science 
                                                 
2 Although all judges in our study had participated in education at the NJC previously, our questions 
about forensic science training were not specific to training at the NJC. Instead, judges were asked to 









evidence through continuing education as a judge (n = 130; 78.3%). However, judges also 
received training through continuing education as a lawyer (n = 81; 48.8%), undergraduate 
studies (n = 28; 16.9%), and law school (n = 23; 13.9%). 
In order to draw comparisons, we also asked judges to report where they should receive 
training about forensic science evidence. As shown in Figure 1, responses were generally 
consistent with actual training contexts. Nearly all judges reported that they should receive 
training on forensic science evidence through continuing education as a judge (n = 153; 92.2%). 
However, responses suggest that judges believe more trainings should occur during law school 
than actually do occur in law school courses (Garrett, Cooper & Beckham, in draft). 
Figure 1 
Judicial Training on Forensic Science Evidence (FSE) 
 


























Where judges have been trained on FSE









Views Concerning the Reliability of Common Forensic Science Disciplines 
Error Rate Estimates 
We asked judges to estimate, as noted, how reliable common forensic science methods 
are. In their responses, judges’ false positive error rate estimates varied both within and across 
different forensic science disciplines (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2 
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Note. M = Million, B = Billion, T = Trillion, Q = Quadrillion.  
As Table 1 depicts, judges typically believed DNA evidence to be the most reliable form 
of forensic evidence. The most common error rate estimate for DNA evidence was 1 error in 
1,000,000 matches, with almost two thirds of judges (63.0%) providing error estimates between 
1 in 100,000 and 1 in one billion matches. Judges indicated that the second most reliable form of 
forensic evidence was toxicology evidence, with 72.4% of judges providing error estimates 
between 1 in 100 and 1 in 100,000 matches. Conversely, judges estimated that bitemark evidence 
and shoeprint evidence were the least reliable forms of evidence. Approximately, 85.7% 
(bitemark evidence) and 81.1% (shoeprint evidence) of judges provided error estimates for these 
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Modal Responses in False Positive Error Rates Provided by Judges 
Forensic Evidence Type False Positive Error Rate Estimate 
DNA Evidence 1 time in 1,000,000 (25.2%) 
Toxicology Evidence 1 time in 100,000 (24.6%) 
Digital Evidence 1 time in 1,000 (20.3%) 
Fingerprint Evidence 1 time in 1,000 (17.9%) 
Firearms Evidence 1 time in 100 (25.9%) 
Bitemark Evidence 1 time in 10 (31.8%) 
Shoeprint Evidence 1 time in 10 (28.0%) 











Judicial Needs for Evaluating Forensic Science Evidence  
Forensic Science Resources 
Judges were asked to rate the current availability of resources to help evaluate and 
understand forensic science evidence presented in their courtroom on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 
= Nonexistent and 10 = Excellent. On average, judges (n = 153) rated the availability of current 
resources at 5.10 (SD = 2.23). However, judges’ perceptions of their current resources varied 
dramatically, with responses ranging from nonexistent to excellent. 
 In addition to commenting on the availability of resources, judges identified the resources 
they use to evaluate and understand forensic science methods via open-ended questioning. Of the 
127 judges who responded, the most common identified resource was legal or scientific research 
articles (n = 46; 36.2%); however, many judges also identified the testimony of experts (n = 39; 
30.7%), continuing education (n = 38; 29.9%) and case law (n = 27; 21.2%) as important 
resources for evaluating and understanding forensics science evidence. 
 Judges were also asked to report additional resources that they would find helpful for 
evaluating and understanding forensic science methods. Of the 117 judge who responded to the 
open-ended question, the most common response was judicial training or education (n = 41; 
39.4%). However, judges also identified online research or reference databases (n = 25; 24.0%), 
and bench books (n = 11; 10.6%), as additional resources they would find helpful. 
Future Training Interests  
To understand judges’ forensic science evidence training needs, we asked judges to rate 









from 1 to 10, with 1 = Not Interested and 10 = Very Interested. Judges reported high levels of 
interest in training on topics such as digital, DNA, toxicology, firearms, and fingerprint evidence. 
Judges showed lower levels of training interest in shoeprint and bitemark evidence. See Table 2 
for detailed results. 
Table 2 
Judicial Forensic Science Evidence Training Interests 
Forensic Evidence Type Mean Level of Interest  
Digital Evidence (n = 144) 8.28 (2.05) 
DNA Evidence (n = 147) 7.80 (2.43) 
Toxicology Evidence (n = 146) 7.66 (2.37) 
Firearms Evidence (n = 145) 7.44 (2.40) 
Fingerprint Evidence (n = 140) 7.02 (2.50) 
Shoeprint Evidence (n = 136) 5.06 (2.94) 









Note. Interest ranged from 1-10, where 1 represented not 
interested, and 10 represented very interested. Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. 
Impact of Past Forensic Science Training  
We next explored whether judges’ participation in forensic science training was 
associated with their views of, and experiences with, forensic science evidence by conducting a 
series of nonparametric analyses. Judicial training on forensic science evidence was associated 
with several viewpoints measured in the present study. Specifically, judges who reported more 
extensive training regarding forensic science evidence endorsed greater familiarity with the 
statistical methods that underlie forensic science evidence, ρ(149) = .21, p = .01, more strongly 
agreed with the sentiment that it is a judge’s responsibility to prevent “junk science” from being 
presented at trial, ρ(150) = .19, p = .02, and perceived increased availability of resources to 
evaluate forensic science evidence, ρ(149) = .40, p < .001. 
Regarding behavioral practices, judicial training in forensic science evidence was not 
associated with the percentage of cases in which judges held an admissibility hearing regarding 
forensic science evidence, ρ(145) = -.14, p = .10. However, judicial training was associated with 
estimated rates of ruling forensic science evidence inadmissible. Specifically, judges who 
endorsed more extensive training in forensic science evidence indicated that they ruled such 
evidence to be inadmissible at greater rates, ρ(133) = -.21, p = .01.  
Finally, to understand the impact of judicial training on perceptions of forensic science 









judicial training in forensic science evidence was unrelated to false positive error rate estimates 
across seven common forensic science disciplines (ps > .05). We next conducted a series of 
Mann-Whitney tests to determine whether judges who endorsed forensic training specific to 
“statistical methods” or “measurement of error rates” provided error rate estimates that differed 
from judges with no such training. Ultimately, judges who completed specific training in 
“statistical methods” or “measurement of error rates” did not provide error rate estimates that 
differed from judges with no specialized training (ps > .05). Moreover, judges who completed 
training in “DNA technology” also did not provide error rate estimates for DNA analyses that 
differed from judges with no such training, p = .84. 
Discussion 
 As criminal investigations and litigation have become more complex and technical, 
judges are called upon to weigh in on a range of scientific issues, and as a result, “scientific 
educational programs for judges are becoming an increasingly important part of continuing 
judicial education” (Cecil, 2017). Little was known about the extent of judicial forensic science 
training or needs for such training. At its most basic, the current findings suggest significant 
variability in judicial practices across the U.S. Among a sample of experienced judges who 
regularly oversee criminal cases, some indicated that they never hold admissibility hearings for 
forensic science evidence while others indicated that they always hold admissibility hearings. 
Further, judges reported that they ruled such evidence to be inadmissible at varying rates that 
were not associated with their jurisdiction’s evidentiary standard. While the participating judges 
may, in fact, encounter forensic work of varying quality, based on their jurisdictions, the 
observed variability in routine practices suggests that standardized judicial training may be 









Of course, most judges in the current sample (90.1%) have completed training specific to 
forensic science evidence, which may make them unusual in this respect. However, the content 
and duration of trainings varied widely. For example, three of four judges (77.1%) received 
training on the standards for admissibility of forensic evidence, but only one in four judges 
(24.1%) received training in statistical methods. Additionally, the recency of judicial training 
varied, with some judges indicating that they last completed training on forensic science during 
undergraduate study. Given the new scientific developments in forensics, including the greater 
focus on use of statistical methods and standards, there may be a real need for continuing 
education in this area. 
Perceptions of Forensic Science Evidence 
There is very little appropriately designed research examining the scientific reliability of 
forensic science disciplines and documenting formal error rates (Koehler, 2017). The few 
existing studies suggest wide-ranging error rates across disciplines. For example, the Netherlands 
Forensic Institute reported that DNA laboratory errors occurred in less than 1% of all analyses 
(Kloosterman, Sjerps, & Quak, 2014). In 2016, the PCAST report concluded that the “best 
estimates” of false positive error rates within latent print evidence are currently 1 in 604 cases 
(0.2%; Ulery, Hicklin, Buscaglia, & Roberts, 2011) and 1 in 24 cases (4.2%; Pacheco, Cerchiai, 
& Stoiloff, 2014). One study examining firearm evidence estimated the false positive error rate 
to be 1 in 66 cases (1.5%; Baldwin, Bajic, Morris, & Zamzow, 2014). At the other end of the 
spectrum, bitemark evidence has demonstrated a 64.0% false positive error rate in one study 
(Faigman, Cheng, Mnookin, Murphy, Sanders, & Slobogin, 2016) and, to our knowledge, there 









Given the lack of established error rates in many forensic science disciplines, and the 
variability in the research base and reliability across disciplines, judges’ perceptions of forensic 
science evidence appear fairly well-informed. Importantly, judges do appear to distinguish 
between forensic science disciplines when evaluating the reliability of evidence. Moreover, their 
general ranking of forensic science disciplines according to false positive error rates appears 
broadly consistent with the extant (and sparse, for many commonly used disciplines) literature on 
the topic.  
However, judges often underestimated the false positive error rates of forensic science 
disciplines, using the few available studies as benchmarks. For example, most judges estimated 
that false positive errors occur in approximately 1 of 1,000 cases in latent fingerprint evidence 
compared to studies suggesting the error rate is between 1 in 604 and 1 in 24 cases (Pacheco et 
al., 2014; Ulery et al., 2011). Judges similarly estimated that errors occur in approximately 1 of 
100 cases in firearm evidence compared to a study providing an error rate estimate of 1 in 66 
cases (Baldwin et al., 2014). Indeed, judges were perhaps most skeptical of bitemark evidence, 
but they still overestimated its reliability, with most judges indicating that false positive errors 
occur in 1 of every 10 cases in contrast to research suggesting error rates closer to 6 of every 10 
cases (Faigman et al., 2016). More concerning, at least one judge (and sometimes as many as 
28% of responding judges) estimated the false positive error rate to be impossible or extremely 
low (i.e., equal to or less than 1 in 1 billion cases) for each discipline. 
This overestimation of the reliability of forensic science evidence is not unique to judges 
and, in fact, judges may overestimate the reliability to a lesser extent than do laypersons or even 
forensic analysts. As an example, Koehler (2017) found that laypersons provided a median false 









colleagues (2019) found that forensic biology analysts typically provided estimates of 1 in 100 
million cases. Judges in this survey provided a higher median estimate of 1 in 1 million cases for 
DNA evidence. Similarly, laypersons provided median estimates of 1 in 5.5 million cases for 
latent print evidence while latent print analysts (n = 7) provided a much lower median false 
positive error rate of 1 in 1 billion. Again, judges in this survey provided a higher median 
estimate of 1 in 1,000 cases; although still overly optimistic, judges’ estimates appear to most 
closely resemble the empirical literature of all surveyed populations. The results also echo 
findings by Garrett and Mitchell (2016) that lawyers are far more skeptical of forensic evidence, 
such as latent print evidence, than laypersons are, although lawyers are also aware that laypeople 
place extremely strong weight on such evidence. 
A recent survey of forensic scientists found that, like judges, practicing analysts often 
overestimated the accuracy of their discipline when compared to existing error rate estimates 
(Murrie et al., 2019). Although the current data cannot speak to this directly, it is possible that 
these findings are closely related. Indeed, it is not surprising that judges overestimate the 
reliability of forensic science disciplines. Judicial educators rely on the information 
communicated by forensic experts, whom also appear to overestimate the reliability of forensic 
science evidence. Approximately one in three surveyed judges (30.7%) identified expert 
testimony as a primary resource for evaluating and understanding forensic sciences. Thus, this 
finding underscores the need for more accurate measurements of error rates by forensic experts. 
With a more accurate understanding of error rates across forensic disciplines among experts, 
judicial educators will be better positioned to provide forensic science evidence training that is 










Current Judicial Needs Regarding Forensic Science 
Judges in the current sample indicated that they typically relied upon journal articles, 
expert testimony, case law, and continuing education to help evaluate and understand forensic 
science methods. However, they did not describe such resources as particularly accessible, with 
an average rating of 5.10 on a scale with 1 = Nonexistent and 10 = Excellent. When asked about 
additional resources that would increase their ability to evaluate forensic sciences, judges 
primarily expressed a desire for additional judicial training and online research/reference 
databases. Judges were specifically interested in receiving training on forensic science 
disciplines that they perceived to be relatively reliable, such as DNA, digital, and toxicology 
evidence. They were especially interested in digital evidence, identifying this discipline as the 
primary method of interest. Finally, judges in the current sample reported that forensic science 
training should more frequently occur during law school and through continuing education as a 
judge than is presently the case. We note that law school coverage of forensic science is not 
common (Garrett, Cooper & Beckham, in draft). Particularly given ongoing and active research 
and standards-setting, continuing education seems much needed.  
Forensic Science Training 
 Although the current research cannot establish causal relationships, results do suggest 
that forensic science training is associated with some judicial views and behavioral practices. 
Judges who completed more training specific to forensic science endorsed greater familiarity 
with related statistical methods. Further, judges with more extensive training were more likely to 
perceive resources that help judges evaluate forensic science evidence as readily available. In 








Judicial training may improve judges’ statistical fluency and also improve judges’ ability to find 
resources needed to critically evaluate forensic science evidence. Indeed, approximately 16% of 
the variance in judges’ perceptions of resource availability was explained by training history. 
 Importantly, judicial training was also associated with how judges view their own role in 
evaluating forensic science evidence. Although Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and its 
progeny, in the states that have adopted the federal standard, instruct judges to evaluate the 
admissibility of forensic science evidence, not all judges agree that this is their duty. Judges with 
more extensive forensic science training in the current study more strongly agree with the 
sentiment that it is a judge’s responsibility to prevent “junk science” from being presented at 
trial. Perhaps relatedly, judges with more training indicated that they ruled forensic science 
evidence to be inadmissible at greater rates.  
Thus, comprehensive training may help judges embrace their roles as gatekeeper and be 
more critical of presented evidence. That said, despite judges’ increased familiarity with 
statistical methods, endorsed training (even training specific to the measurement of error rates) 
did not influence judges’ perceptions regarding the reliability of forensic science disciplines (i.e., 
false positive error rate estimates). Careful examination of forensic science error rates may 
represent a worthy focus for future training curriculum. We did not ask judges about other 
interventions designed to educate jurors, which themselves might require judicial education. For 
example, jury instructions might convey additional information to jurors about the strength and 
limitations of forensic evidence (Garrett, Crozier, & Grady, 2020). Or judges may instead 










 These results also suggest that further judicial training is important not because judges 
are unaware of differences in the reliability of forensic evidence, but rather because judges 
would like to render more informed rulings on these technical subjects. Indeed, past research has 
found that judges’ primary motivation for judicial education is their own professional growth 
(Murphy, Kemmelmeier, & Grimes, in press).This suggests, then, that training may further 
inform judicial decisions, but not necessarily alter the overall priorities and perspectives of 
judges. To be sure, this study surveyed judicial attitudes towards forensic science disciplines, 
training, and their gatekeeping role. We did not measure how judges actually rule in cases before 
them, nor what other non-gatekeeping actions they might take to assure the comprehensibility 
and the reliability of evidence relied upon in criminal cases. To what degree training and 
education affect behavior is an important subject for future research; there is little research 
generally on the connection between legal education and the quality of the work that lawyers and 
judges do in any setting. 
Conclusion 
  
 We surveyed a national sample of judges regarding their background in forensic science, 
views concerning the reliability of forensic disciplines, and educational needs regarding forensic 
science evidence. We found that participant judges held views concerning the scientific support 
for different forensic disciplines that were fairly consistent with available literature. We did not 
find any association between prior training and how judges rated the reliability of forensic 
science disciplines. However, we did find that training corresponded with judges’ views that they 
should, and reports that they do in fact, take on a more active gatekeeping role regarding 









properly evaluate evidence, they reported having very different backgrounds in relevant 
scientific concepts. These results support new efforts to expand scientific evidence education in 
the judiciary, particularly as they may inform both greater judicial understanding of key methods 
and concepts, and have the potential to produce better informed judicial decisions. 
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Wójcikiewicz, J. (2013). Judges’ attitude towards scientific evidence. Revija za kriminalistiko in 










Conflict of interest 
The authors have no conflicts of interest to disclose. 
 
Jo
ur
na
l P
re
-p
ro
of
View publication stats
